Stabilizing monetary policy in a small open economy is constrained by the open economy trilemma. In this paper, we investigate whether foreign exchange market interventions and the Central Bank's credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) may soften this constraint and improve the results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model appropriate for analyzing the forward-looking behavior of households facing non-zero probabilities of losing access to financial market and CROR. We have found significant credit rationing in the quarterly Russian data of 2001:Q1-2014:Q2. The probability of losing access to financial market and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Using Russian data of 2001:Q1-2014:Q2 we demonstrate that CROR provoked forward-looking activity in financial market, which led to more Ruble devaluation in the crises of 2008-2009. It improved poor countercyclical performance of two Russian monetary policy rules, whereas made small effect on welfare. Welfare maximization exercises reveal a tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare solutions and favor of a floating exchange rate regime. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both exchange rate-based and Taylor rule-based models but resulting improvement in welfare is very small.
Introduction
During the global financial crises, most emerging markets economies (EMEs) were griped in a vice. On the one hand, their currencies were devalued after negative external shocks: capital outflow, commodity price fall, and increased world financial market volatility. Countries with significant currency mismatch and big exchange rate path-through might suffer from such devaluation and monetary authorities looked for tight monetary policy measures. On the other hand, economic recession, local financial markets crunch, banking sector problems demanded for loose monetary policy. Difficulty of this type follows from open economy trilemma constraint (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, & Taylor, 2005) and is widely discussed in seminal paper devoted to twin crises of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) . In such a situation traditional interest rate manipulations is not enough and Central Bank (CB) should use all available monetary policy measures which could help resolving such CONTACT Andrei G. Shulgin andrei.shulgin@gmail.com problems bundle. In this paper, we analyze two additional instruments in the monetary toolkit: foreign exchange market interventions (FX interventions) and credit rationing (CR). FX intervention was widely recognized as useful and to a certain extent independent monetary instrument long before the global financial crisis (BIS, 2005; Calvo & Reinhart, 2002) . During the global financial crisis, this instrument was intensively used by monetary authorities in many countries to avoid excessive currency depreciation and it is now considered as the conventional monetary tool (Domanski, Kohlscheen, & Moreno, 2016) . Several papers were devoted to DSGE modeling of two independent monetary policy instruments framework: Escudé (2013) , Benes, Berg, Portillo, and Vavra (2015) , Ghosh, Ostry, and Chamon (2015) , Shulgin (2014 Shulgin ( , 2015 demonstrated that, first, this instrument was really used by many CBs in a regular manner and, second, systematic using of FX intervention is helpful for welfare optimization. In this paper, we use estimated DSGE model to address the question of optimal parameter in the exchange rate rule which is responsible for exchange rate regime choice. It helps us to answer the question of whether we need systematic and predictable FX interventions for better macroeconomic performance.
CR is not drawing much attention of economists because developed countries did not use it explicitly during and after the global financial crisis. But this monetary measure does deserve rapt attention because, first, some EMEs used it explicitly for improving monetary performance (we will discuss Russian case), second, stepwise quantitative easing (QE) may also be thought as CR of specific nature. 1 To distinguish CR as monetary measure from CR in traditional meaning we introduce the term 'credit rationing at the official rate' (CROR) which means a situation where private demand for loans exceed supply at the set by monetary authority official (policy) interest rate. We will use the same term for the reverse situation: private supply of assets exceeds demand at the prevailing official rate. CROR is assumed to be performed by CB because it clears the loans market after it sets official (policy) interest rate and have an ability to introduce some obstacles for borrowers. In their seminal paper Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) , J&S hereinafter, have presented examples of using CR in US monetary policy. As far as I know, the CROR assumption has never been introduced in the DSGE framework but many properties of theoretical models with CR are widely discussed earlier and should be mentioned here. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrated that informational asymmetries like adverse selection and moral hazard effect may lead to optimal CR in loan market equilibrium. Demand for loans exceeds supply because the expected bank's return increases nonmonotonously with increasing interest rate and banks prefer CR to higher interest rate. Resolving information asymmetries problem, for example by loan collateral (Besanko & Takor, 1987) could possibly decrease the importance of CR. The last effect makes CR procyclical mechanism because the volume of collateral is decreasing in a crisis and it limits private agents' ability to consume and invest in a period of low real income.
J&S although did not propose the theoretical model for analyzing the macroeconomic impact of CR on the economy, but pointed out several important macroeconomic effects of CR. J&S note that the response of real expenditure on CR will be with lag and have a multiplier effect. They also assume that ' . . . anticipation of future CR may have current effect even when there is no CR at present and, hence, impact of CR can not be assessed just in the period in which there is direct evidence for its presence'. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also pointed out that CR may also be . . . viewed as temporary disequilibrium phenomena . . . that is the economy has incurred an exogenous shock and for reasons not fully explained, there is some stickiness in the price of capital (interest rate) so that there is a transitional period during which rationing of credit occurs . . . . So CR actively interacts with real part of the economy, creates both forward-looking behavior and lagged real variables response and is better analyzed in a general equilibrium framework.
J&S also associate CR with borrowing constraint on household's decision about consumption. This idea is traced back to simple Keynesian theory in which consumption expenditures are determined by current income rather than permanent income. Many empirical papers confirm the existence of liquidity constrained households (Attanasio & Weber, 2010; Campbell & Mankiw, 1990 , 1991 . Many authors introduce this assumption in theoretical models and use several terms for labeling constrained households: Rule-of-Thumb consumers, spenders, Non-Ricardian consumers; Bilbiie (2008) analyzes limited asset market participation (LAMP), whereas Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001) consider segmented money market. The idea of liquidity constrained households existence allows us to distinguish among different types of CR: first, we assume that some households may lose access to the financial market (be liquidity constrained) in present or in the future and this type of CR is not caused by monetary policy; second, we assume that monetary authorities may limit access to financing at the official rate and this type of CR (labeled as 'CROR') is controlled by CB. Note that for organizing CROR in normal time monetary authorities should make deliberate constraints on borrowing, whereas in a crisis time an ability of commercial banks to borrow decreases as loan collateral decreases and CB should decide whether to weaken borrowing conditions or to limit banks access to financing though collateral decrease. To illustrate how it may work in practice we consider the Russian case. 2 CR may be thought of as a special type of financial market imperfection; hence this paper is related with wide literature devoted to introducing financial frictions in DSGE models. In the papers of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , Karadi (2011), and Kiyotaki (2010) financial frictions arise as a result of restrictions on the net worth of the firm. They also may be the result of monitoring costs as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or collateral constraints Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) .
2 During the global financial crisis, Russian interbank interest rate was frequently higher than official (refinance) rate. Russian commercial banks faced with a lack of collateral instruments and had no ability to borrow a needed volume of liquidity from Central Bank. To resolve the liquidity shortage problem authorities elaborated different facilities (Aleksashenko et al., 2011) and the most important one was uncollateralized lending auctions (ULA) conducted by Bank of Russia (BoR). Interest rate on the ULA was usually higher than interbank rate and demand always exceeded supply in a crises. So the volume of liquidity supplied through the ULA was controlled by BoR and was an important monetary policy instrument. To decrease speculative pressure on foreign exchange market BoR limited volume of liquidity supplied through the ULA. Other way BoR used ULA was the threat to reduce borrowing limits for commercial banks which speculate on the foreign exchange market. Facing the probability of not getting financing through the ULA Russian banks behaved in a forward-looking manner. Similar situation was in the foreign crediting boom of 2005-2007 when the short-term interbank interest rate was far below refinance rate. BoR issued sterilizing facilities and chose the volume of sterilized liquidity due to the needs of its anti-inflationary policy.
All these papers assume that financial frictions originate from the interaction between private lenders and private borrowers while CBs should just take that feature into account in optimizing monetary policy design. Another important distinction of CR modeling used in this paper is that constrained in current period households realize that such constraint is not forever and may disappear in the future. It may amplify households' forward-looking activity based on the predictable future response of exchange rate and the interest rate on shocks and the probability of losing access to the financial market in the future. We will demonstrate that such behavior may serve as a countercyclical mechanism for the economy with weak interest rate rule and managed exchange rate.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. A Bayesian estimation demonstrates that the introduction of liquidity constrained households and CROR into the DSGE model is justified by Russian quarterly data of 2001:Q1-2014:Q2. The probability of losing access to financial market and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Simulation of the model on Russian data of 2001:Q1-2014:Q2 demonstrates that CROR provoked forward-looking activity in the financial market, which led to more Ruble devaluation in the crises of 2008-2009. It improved poor countercyclical performance of two Russian monetary policy rules, whereas made small effect on welfare. Simulating a DSGE model with different values of coefficients in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate adjustment rule, and the CROR parameter allows welfare optimization exercises. The results demonstrate a tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare regimes. We have found that a floating regime appears to be the best solution for Russia for all the optimization exercises conducted. A welfare optimization over CROR parameter gives a mixed result. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both the exchange rate-based and Taylor rule-based models. On the other hand, the resulting improvement in welfare is very small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the DSGE model for a small open economy with two independent monetary policy instruments and two types of CR. In Section 3 we perform a calibration of the parameters which determine the steady state of the model and a Bayesian estimation of other parameters on the basis of a Russian de-seasoned de-trended series: consumption, output, inflation, exchange rate, official interest rate, international reserves, risk premium, and commodity price. Section 4 presents the results of model simulations and welfare optimization exercises. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
To deal with different aspects of monetary policy in a small open oil-exporting economy we build medium-scale multi-sector DSGE model with nominal wage and price rigidities, real capital adjustment costs, financial market imperfections and two independent monetary policy instruments.
A small open economy is inhabited by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Households supply labor services in a monopolistically competitive market, make liquidity constrained decisions on their consumption and manage different types of firms. Multisector structure of the model 3 allows comprehensive description of monetary transmission channel, which is crucial for the purposes of the paper. Standard approach in the literature devoted to the investigation of monetary policy in a small open economy assumes two types of intermediate goods: home-produced and imported goods. But in our case, we have cogent arguments for introducing a richer market structure. First, we assume that commodity goods are produced in the commodity sector (X). Commodity price is exogenously determined outside of the economy and creates unique terms of trade shock which plays a significant role in commodity exporters' business-cycle (Céspedes & Velasco, 2012; Chen & Rogoff, 2003) . Second, home-produced goods are subdivided into tradable (manufactured M) and non-tradable (N) sectors. This subdivision is standard and important in a case of two independent monetary policy instruments, because the two sectors have a unique reaction on official interest rate and exchange rate adjustment shocks and hence, results of welfare optimization procedures are sensitive to the presence of nontradable goods in the model. 4 Third, the model is estimated by Bayesian method and has a strong econometric interpretation which usually assumes including enough model blocks for reflecting as many business-cycle properties as possible. We also traditionally assume that final (Z) goods and services are created with CES technologies from manufactured, non-tradable and imported (F) goods in the perfectly competitive market. Households choose their consumption path subject to liquidity constraints of two types which are modeled a la Calvo. Households also make different traditional restricted optimization routines: set prices in monopolistic competitive markets subject to nominal rigidity assumptions of Calvo-Yun model and choose investments subject to capital adjustment costs.
The government decides on its spending and does not issue debt, maintaining zero budget deficits. In presence of nominal and real rigidities and different types of shocks, CB tries to maximize welfare by choosing appropriate coefficients in two independent monetary policy rules: Taylor-type rule and exchange rate adjustment rule. It also chooses the degree (intensity) of CROR. CB performs discretionary monetary policy which is associated with monetary policy shocks. 5
Households

Utility and Budget Constraint
Household j utility function is
where β is the intertemporal discount factor; η b,t is the intertemporal preference shock which helps to account for unexplained volatility in consumption. All structural shocks η t in the model are expected to have zero mean and not expected to be iid processes. Instantaneous utility is
where C t (j) is consumption of household j; hC t−1 is the external habits in consumption; h ∈ (0, 1) is a habits parameter; H N,t (j) and H X,t (j) are hours worked in the manufactured (M), non-tradable (N) and commodity (X) sectors respectively. Parameter σ C is the relative risk aversion coefficient or the inverse of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of consumption; parameter σ H is the inverse of the Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply. Households can buy or sell foreign denominated securities B * t (j) on an incomplete international financial market. Cost of funding for households j:
where foreign risk free interest rate i * t is assumed to be an exogenous constant; risk premium rp t (j) depends on the foreign indebtedness level of household j, as in Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007) :
where S t is the foreign exchange rate; B * t (j) is the volume of private foreign assets of household j; P t is the price level; Y t is the aggregate output level; τ is the sensitivity of risk premium to indebtedness level; η rp,t is the risk premium shock.
Households can also buy/issue bonds denominated in the domestic currency B t (j) at the official rate i ref ,t set by the CB, which supply/demand domestic currency bonds B t to clear the market.
Every household with some probability may lose access to the financial markets and the ability to manipulate their bond volume B * t (j) and B t (j). Every household should also take into account the possibility of such events in the future when it can optimize B t (j) and B * t (j). Households get rental payments Q i,t on their capital K i,t (j); wages W i,t for the hours they work H i,t (j), where i = M, N, X; payments for natural resources used in commodity goods production P L,t L t (j); profit from monopolistically competitive markets D t (j) = D M,t (j) + D N,t (j) + D F,t (j), and income from previous period securities B t−1 (j)(1
. Household j consumes goods and services C t (j), invests in the capital of their firms in three intermediate goods sectors I t (j) = I M,t (j) + I N,t (j) + I X,t (j), pays lump-sum taxes T t (j), sends net transfers S t NT t (j) abroad, and purchases domestic and foreign denominated securities B t (j) and B * t (j) respectively. Household budget constraint summarizes all its incomes and purchases:
Financial Decisions in Presence of CR
As in many DSGE models constructed for developing economies (for example, Sosunov and Zamulin (2007) for Russia) we assume that some households have no ability to make an intertemporal optimization of their consumption path. It could be potentially useful in explaining the high correlation between consumption and current income variables in the data. I also assume some limitation on getting financing in home currency at the official rate. It helps explaining that the interest rate of marginal financing may be in the range between the official rate i ref ,t and the rate which is based on foreign interest rate, expected devaluation and the risk premium. Let us assume that every household in every period gets two random independent of each other signals about their ability to borrow/invest money in different financial market segments. The first signal reveals whether household j has the ability to optimize its consumption path using any financial market instrument. If it gets such signal (with the probability 1 − θ A ) it may adjust its financial instruments: B t and B * t . With probability θ A household j loses access to financial market and has to consume its current income. We label the last group 'temporarily liquidity constrained' households.
The second signal reveals whether household j has access to financing at the official (refinance) rate i ref ,t . If it gets such signal (with probability 1 − θ B ) it may adjust both B t and B * t . With probability θ B household j has no ability to adjust B t and may adjust only its foreign assets volume B * t .
First Signal: Financial Market Participation.
The equation, which describes the solution of the utility function (1) maximization problem subject to budget constraint in the presence of liquidity constrained households (determined by the first signal), is derived in Appendix A and takes the form 6 :
where the marginal utility of consumption for optimizing household is
where C o t is the consumption level for the optimizing in current period households. Having no ability to use financial instruments in the current period households consume their current income:
where Y M,N,X,t is the output in manufactured (M), non-tradable (N) and commodity (X) sectors respectively; P M,N,X,t is the price level in manufactured (M), non-tradable (N) and commodity (X) sectors respectively. In the first-order condition (6) the variables J o t and J n t are forward-looking auxiliary variables which describe an incomplete smoothing of consumption:
Aggregating consumption gives
2.1.2.2. Second Signal: Financing at the Official Rate. When a household gets the ability to optimize the level of home assets B t it solves the problem of optimal financial resources allocation subject to the possibility of losing the excess to financial markets in the future. The first-order condition for the problem of choosing optimal private foreign assets B * o t (determined by the second signal) is derived in Appendix A and takes the form:
where η B,t is the optimal foreign assets shock; auxiliary variables which describe the incomplete adjustment of interest rate i t to the official rate i ref ,t are
where B * opt t is the level of foreign assets for the case when a household may adjust its level of B t in every period without constraints (see Appendix A).
where
where Fin t is the change in optimal households financing (see Appendix A). Taking into account two types of constraint we introduce in the model, the aggregate levels of foreign and home assets held by households are
Investments and Labor Supply
The capital dynamics of the intermediate good sectors i = X, M, N are given by:
is the adjustment cost function and ϕ K > 0 is the coefficient of adjustment costs.
First-order condition for capital stock in sectors i = X, M, N is
1 is the inflation rate definition and; Q t is the capital good price.
In each sector i = X, M, N households supply their labor to a recruiting agency, which uses the next aggregation technology:
where φ H > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among different types of labor. Demand for each labor type j is
Household j chooses the optimal wage according to the Calvo (1983) model with indexation as in Yun (1996) . It gets a random signal to adjust the wage from the previous
Aggregation of all households' decisions gives:
Maximizing the expected discounted value of the utility function (1) subject to labor demand equations (22) gives three optimal conditions:
where H,t = −H σ H t is the marginal utility of labor, J W,i,t and N W,i,t are auxiliary forwardlooking variables describing labor supply process.
Commodity Goods Production
Commodity goods (X-sector) are produced from aggregated capital K X,t = 1 0 K X,t (j)dj, aggregated worked hours H X,t = 1 0 H X,t (j)dj and natural resourse L t . The production function of commodities is
are the shares of natural resource owner income, capital owner income and worker income in the total commodity sector income respectively. 7 Natural resource supply is absolutely inelastic: L t =L, while demand for the country's commodity export is absolutely elastic because of the small open economy assumption. The domestic commodity price is P X,t = S t P * X,t , where the world commodity price P * X,t follows AR(1) process:
where η PX,t is the commodity price shock. First-order conditions for commodity producer are
Equations (29)-(31) define the demand functions for resources used in the X-sector production function. The perfect competition assumption implies zero profit in the Xsector D X,t = 0.
The produced commodity goods Y X,t are exported Y ex X,t at world commodity price P * X,t and used as intermediate goods in the production of manufactured Y M X,t and non-tradable Y N X,t goods.
Manufactured and Non-tradable Goods Production
The production of manufactured (M-sector) and non-tradable (N-sector) goods is similar in most aspects. In both sectors we have a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by k ∈ [0, 1], which produce differentiated goods. The production function for producer k in each sector z = M, N is
jk)dj are aggregated capital and worked hours, respectively, used by producer k; A t is the total factor productivity following AR(1) process:
Aggregation technology in both sectors sector is
where φ is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods. Demand function for producer k is
We assume Calvo-Yun pricing with indexation on the previous rate of inflation. Firm k gets a random signal to adjust its price to the optimal level P o z,t (k) with probability 1 − θ. If firm k does not get such signal it indexes the previous period price on the previous rate of inflation π t−1 : P z,t (k) = P z,t−1 (k)(1 + π t−1 ) χ , where χ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of price indexation. The aggregate real price level in both sectors is
Profit of monopolistic competitor k in both sectors in period t + l, subject to price P o z,t (k), is set in period t and is indexed until the period t + l:
First-order conditions for the problem
where ξ z,t (k) ≡ (MC z,t (k))/P t is the real marginal cost for the firm k in sector z = M, N; J z,i,t and N z,i,t are auxiliary forward-looking variables describing the pricing in sectors z = M, N; and η μ,t is the markup shock which explains the inflation volatility. Equations (38)-(40) describe optimal demands for production factors: capital, labor and commodity goods, respectively. Equations (41)-(43) 
Zero transaction costs and the producer currency pricing principle imply P *
where w ex is the share of world demand for domestic manufactured goods, υ is the elasticity of substitution among domestic and foreign goods in the world market; Y * t is an exogenous world demand evolving according to the AR(1) process:
where η Y * ,t is the foreign demand shock. We assume infinite transaction costs of exporting non-tradable goods so the whole volume of produced goods Y N,t is sold domestically to the final goods producer. Demand functions for domestically consumed intermediate goods Y d M,t and Y N,t follow from the optimization of the final goods production.
Imported Goods
The continuum of importing firms (F-sector) indexed by k ∈ [0, 1] acquire homogeneous goods from abroad at price P * t and produce a unit of differentiated good from a unit of homogeneous good with zero costs. Importer k is the monopolistic competitor choosing price P F,t (k) to maximize the expected utility of a household.
Demand for importer k is
are the aggregated output and the aggregated price level in F-sector, respectively.
As in other sectors with monopolistic competition we assume Calvo-Yun pricing with indexation on the previous rate of inflation. Parameter 1 − θ ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of getting signal of price adjustment while χ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of price indexation. The aggregated real price level in F-sector is
Profit of importer k in period t + l subject to price P o F,t (k) is set in period t and is just indexed until the period t + l:
(49) The first-order conditions for the optimization problem of importer k
where R t ≡ (S t · P * t /P t ) is the real foreign exchange rate and; J F,i,t and N F,i,t are auxiliary forward-looking variables describing the staggered Calvo-Yun pricing in F-sector.
Final Goods Production
The final goods Z t are produced from intermediate non-tradable goods Y N,t , manufactured goods Y d M,t and imported goods Y F,t in a perfectly competitive market with the CES production function:
where κ > 0 is the elasticity of the substitution of inputs in the production function; (0, 1) assign the shares of sectors M, N and F in domestic consumption, respectively. First-order conditions for a representative firm in Z-sector define demands for inputs:
The demand for final goods consists of private consumption C t , government spending G t and investments I t :
where I t = I M,t + I N,t + I X,t is the aggregate investments.
Government
The government in the model does not issue bonds and has a zero budget deficit:
where T t = 1 0 T t (j)dj is the aggregate lump-sum taxes; D CB,t is the CB profit. Government spending G t equals its steady-state value:
The Central Bank (CB)
The CB issues money M t and its own securities B t backed by international reserves:
where IR t = S t IR * t are the domestic currency international reserves; IR * t are the foreign currency international reserves.
If B t > 0 we assume that the CB issues securities bought by households. In the opposite case B t < 0 households issue securities bought by the CB, which issues money backed by the securities. The CB profit consists of interest on foreign and domestic assets and is fully transferred to the government:
As in Escudé (2013), Benes et al. (2015) , Ghosh et al. (2015) , Shulgin (2014) the CB uses the two monetary policy instruments independently. It means that we have two independent monetary policy rules in the model.
The exchange rate adjustment rule is based on international reserves dynamics 8 :
where k IR is the coefficient of the exchange rate flexibility or the absolute value of the elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to international reserves; a stationary level of any endogenous variable X t is denoted byX; η S,t are the discretionary exchange rate policy shocks.
The exchange rate augmented Taylor rule allows the CB to stabilize the fluctuations of real variables, inflation and exchange rate:
where k Y , k π , k S > 0 are Taylor rule coefficients; ε PR,t is the discretionary component of the interest rate dynamics following AR(1) process:
where η PR,t is the official rate shock; ρ PR is the persistence parameter of the official rate dynamics. The CB uses CROR by making the probability of getting credit at the official rate less than one. This presumably helps correct the open economy trilemma constraint for better monetary policy performance. To show this we estimate the model and make welfare optimization exercises.
General Equilibrium
We analyze a symmetric equilibrium with identical decisions of households and firms:
Nominal GDP definition in the model is
where P def t is the GDP deflator. Real GDP is calculated on the base of stationary prices:
whereP M ,P N andP X are stationary levels of prices in the manufactured, non-tradable and commodity sectors, respectively. Balance of payments equation in the model is
The Bayesian Estimation
The model parameterization combines the calibration of the parameters which determine the steady state of the model and the Bayesian estimation of the parameters which determine the model dynamics and can be revealed from de-trended data. We calibrate the model on the basis of Russian macro-statistics. In Table A1 we can find the empirical ratios needed for the steady-state calculation. Other calibrated parameters are presented in Table A2 .
The Bayesian estimation is based on eight de-seasoned and Hoddrick-Prescott detrended Russian series of consumption C t , output (real GDP) Y t , CPI inflation π t , commodity price index P X,t , exchange rate (nominal effective exchange rate) S t , international reserves IR * t , the official rate (refinance rate) i ref ,t , risk premium (CDS spread) rp t . The time sample is 2001:Q1-2014:Q2 (54 quarters). We start from 2001 because Russian macroeconomic dynamics was mainly determined by the crisis of 1998 before that year. 9 The end of the sample corresponds to the period of high exchange rate volatility which eventually prompted BoR to hasten the transition to free-floating regime in the end of 2014. To fit eight observable variables we use eight structural shocks: intertemporal preferences shock η b,t , risk premium shock η rp,t , markup shock η μ,t , commodity price shock η PX,t , total factor productivity shock η A,t , exchange rate policy shock η S,t , official rate shock η PR,t , optimal foreign assets shock η B,t .
Priors
We use both informative and non-informative prior distributions for the estimated parameters. We use a Gamma-distribution for setting priors for the utility function parameters σ C , σ H and capital adjustment costs ϕ K and Beta-distributions for the habit parameter h, the Calvo-pricing parameter θ , the share of temporarily liquidity constrained households θ A , the probability of CROR θ B . Other parameters have non-informative uniformly distributed priors. Table A1 presents all prior distributions.
The means of prior distributions for utility function parameters are set at E(σ C ) = 2 and E(σ H ) = 1 as in Dib (2008) . Prior means for the habit parameter h and the Calvo-pricing parameter θ are 0.5 and 0.75, respectively. We need non-flat priors for the four referenced parameters to alleviate the problem of likelihood function flatness. We set a relatively high standard deviation of their prior distributions (weak priors) reflecting a shortage of prior information about these parameters.
We set the prior mean at E(θ A ) = 0.4 and the standard deviation at σ (θ A ) = 0.1 for the share of temporarily liquidity constrained households. The usual practice is to set the prior mean for θ A at 0.5, but in the model we have two types of CR and the contribution of the liquidity constraint is less than in a model with only a liquidity constraint.
Vernikov (2009) calculated the share of state-influenced banks in total banking assets as 45.4% (in 2007). 53 state-influenced banks had better financing during the crises of 2008-2009 and their share in total assets is possible proxy for estimation of CR parameter. Aleksashenko, Mironov, and Miroshnichenko (2011) found that from September 2008 till March 2009 about 60% of foreign exchange market interventions were sterilized by the BoR and The Ministry of Finance. Unsterilized part of foreign exchange market interventions gives us more prior information about θ B . We set the mean of the prior distribution of θ B at 0.546.
In the Bayesian estimation we do not use information about the Russian labor market, so we fix the Calvo parameter for wages at θ W = 0.75 (the average period for wage adjustment is 1 year) for stable results of the posterior density function maximization. The parameters of the autoregressive process for commodity prices P X,t , are estimated separately from other parameters and fixed in Bayesian procedures at σ (η PX ) = 0.119 ρ PX = 0.713. I also fix the coefficient in the Taylor rule k Y = 0 and indexation parameters for intermediate goods prices χ = 0 and wages χ W = 0 as we have prior information that they are non-negative and the likelihood function is decreasing with respect to these parameters in non-negative zone.
Estimation Results
To calculate likelihood function for the model I use Kalman filter, realized in Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011) . Marco Ratto's 'newrat' algorithm (see Adjemian et al., 2011) is used for maximization of posterior function. Quantitative analysis of the estimated model is based on posterior modes.
First I estimate the Baseline model (M1) which includes both liquidity constraints (LC) and CROR blocks. To reveal the contribution of the LC and CROR blocks, and to check robustness I estimate three modifications of M1: a model which includes only the LC block (M2); the model which includes only the CROR block (M3); and the model which includes neither (M4).
The results of the posterior density function maximization for the four models M1-M4 are presented in Table A3 . We have received correctly interpreted estimates for all parameters in models M1-M4. Modes for household preference parameters in M1 are σ C = 1.96 and σ H = 2.39. The value of intertemporal elasticity substitution is 1/σ C = 0.51 and it significantly deviates from the calculation of that parameter on micro-data in Khvostova, Larin, and Novak (2014) (1/σ C ∼ = 5). A possible explanation is that Khvostova et al. (2014) did not take into account alternative ways of explaining the high correlation between consumption and current income. The mode for Calvo-pricing parameter is relatively high (θ = 0.91) and corresponds to 2 years and 9 months of the average duration period for the price adjustment. The habit parameter is estimated at h = 0.71 in M1. The mode for the sensitivity of risk premium to indebtedness level is estimated as τ = 0.0278.
The modes for the coefficients in the Taylor rule are k π = 0.0425 and k S = 0.0185 with a persistence parameter ρ PR = 0.64 for M1. We call this result the 'weak Taylor rule' because the low official rate reaction to inflation and to the output gap does not contribute to the stabilization of the real part of the economy. The mode of the exchange rate flexibility coefficient is estimated as k S = 0.296 for M1. We call this result the 'strong exchange rate rule' because both the exchange rate and international reserves make about equal contribution in the balance of payment adjustment.
The share of temporarily liquidity constrained households is estimated at a relatively low level (θ A = 0.218). To check this result we performed an estimation of the model without the forward-looking behavior of households (model with the LC and CROR blocks and the usual Euler equation). The result was the same as in M1: θ A = 0.225. The probability of CROR is estimated at a relatively high level: θ B = 0.664. Table A4 presents the calculation of most important correlations for models M1-M4 in comparison with historical data.
Models M3 and M4, without liquidity constrained households, are unable to explain the high historical correlation between consumption, and output and oil prices, while they better explain the correlations between the exchange rate and international reserves, and oil prices than models M1 and M2. The correlations calculated for M1 demonstrate a tradeoff between explaining the high correlations between consumption, and output and oil prices, and explaining the high correlations between the exchange rate and international reserves, and oil prices.
If we assume that the data are described by one of four models M1-M4 we can calculate posterior probabilities that the model Mj is true. Table A4 demonstrates that M1 with both the LC and CROR blocks strongly dominates other alternative models: 89.2% vs. 10.8% for M2-M4 together.
We can see impulse-response functions (IRF) for six endogenous variables, four shocks, and four models in Figures A1-A4 . IRF of consumption on all shocks in models M3 and M4 are much more smoothed than for M1 and M2. This fact agrees with the low correlation between consumption and the current income variables for models M3 and M4 (see Table  A4 ). IRF of the exchange rate and international reserves for M1 are more persistent than for other models and this fact agrees with the lower mode of the exchange rate flexibility coefficient for M1 (see Table A3 ). The reaction of foreign assets to shocks for M1 is the most smoothed among all models.
All tests made for adequacy of the four models favor M1, so we use it in the welfare analysis.
Welfare Analysis and the Optimal Monetary Regime
First, we discuss the results of the model simulation on Russian data assuming no CROR. Then we make welfare maximization exercises to reveal the most appropriate monetary regime for the economy, configured by estimated on Russian data shocks.
Role of CR at Official Rate in Russian Macroeconomic Dynamics
For better understanding the role of CROR in explaining Russian data and in stabilizing monetary policy, we simulate estimated model assuming no CROR (θ B = 0) on the base of historical shocks revealed in a process of Baseline model estimation. It allows us finding of the CROR contribution to macroeconomic dynamics. Results of this exercise are shown in Figures A5-A8 . Figure A5 demonstrates the moderately countercyclical contribution of CROR to Russian consumption C t and output Y t before and after the global financial crises (GFC) and strongly countercyclical contribution during the GFC. At the same time, the contribution of CROR to hours worked H t and utility t ( Figure A6 ) appeared to be weakly pro-cyclical. For understanding that result we should note that the contribution of CROR to exchange rate S t and international reserves IR t has a positive correlation with observable cyclical components of these variables during the GFC ( Figure A7 ). CROR made the main contribution in the dynamics of exchange rate and international reserves during the GFC. The same picture could be found in the dynamics of home B t and foreign B * t assets ( Figure A8 ).
Capital market imperfections were the source of overshooting and further gradual adjustment in net foreign assets B * t dynamics and led to more international reserves losses compared with no CROR case. As a result, we get more significant Ruble devaluation comparing with no CROR case which improved weak demand for home-produced goods and made countercyclical contribution to consumption and GDP dynamics. At the same time, the increase in hours worked H t appeared to be not significant compared to its fluctuations in response to other structural shocks. Resulting effect on the utility in the period of the GFC was small and ambiguous.
We may conclude that relying on weak Taylor rule together with limited exchange rate adjustment, the BoR could create a very limited countercyclical impulse for the Russian economy. Expectations about the possibility to lose the access to financial markets and financing at the official rate in the future provoked forward-looking behavior based on the predictability of gradual exchange rate adjustment. This behavior led to deeper Ruble devaluation in comparison with the Baseline model, and generated a positive countercyclical effect on home demand during the GFC. This result contradicts to the financial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) where financial market frictions make a pro-cyclical effect on the economy. Such a contradiction is conceivably related to the dubious monetary regime and, particularly the role of the exchange rate rule (62) the BoR used during the GFC. This rule weakens the automatic stabilizer effect of exchange rate in response to structural shocks and restricts the ability of monetary authorities to use countercyclical interest rate rule. Financial market imperfections generate forwardlooking behavior which amplifies automatic stabilizer effect of exchange rate. This unusual effect on the one hand, favor CROR, on the other hand it is hardly imagined that based on frictions and created by speculative behavior mechanism would be the first best solution of the monetary regime choice problem.
Optimal Regime Choice
For choosing the most appropriate monetary regime we maximize unconditional welfare over the coefficients in the Taylor rule k π , k Y , k S exchange rate flexibility coefficient k IR , and the probability of CROR θ B . To get a reasonable and interpretable solution we impose limitations on the optimized coefficients. The optimized parameters in the monetary policy rules should be non-negative for the non-increasing pro-cyclicality of the corresponding variables k π ≥ 0, k Y ≥ 0, k S ≥ 0, k IR ≥ 0 (the pro-cyclicality constraint). The probability of CROR should be within its natural limits θ B ∈ [0, 1] (the natural constraint). In some welfare optimization exercises the coefficient k π should correspond to the inflation targeting framework k π ≥ 1.1 (the institutional constraint). All coefficients should lead to a unique and stable solution of the model, that is, the number of stable roots N(λ ≤ 1) should be equal to the number of predetermined variables N pred in the model (the stability constraint).
The second-order Taylor series expansion of the utility function around steady state gives:
where the variable with tilde denotes the logarithmic deviation of the variable from its steady-state value.
We make the decomposition of the unconditional expectation of utility on the level effect and stabilization (variance) effect as in Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) and Dib (2008) . Ambler et al. (2004) argue that we should use both effects in optimization, while Shulgin (2015) have demonstrated that the calculation of the level effect in a similar DSGE model is unstable for a small sample of historical data. We base the welfare optimization on the stabilization (variance) effect only, and for convenience express the results of the expected utility calculations in terms of compensative variation (CV) of deterministic consumption.
The main optimization criterion in terms of CV of the deterministic consumption μ v is determined by:
We cannot rely merely on the criteria (69), so we also take into account the second unconditional moments of inflation Eπ 2 t and the foreign exchange rate ES 2 t . Both variances characterize price stability which may not be captured by the main criterion.
Optimal Inflation Targeting Rule
We first solve the constrained optimization problem: (70) and results are shown in Table A5 .
The solution to the problem (70) characterizes the optimal rules in an inflation targeting regime and demonstrates the ability to improve unconditional welfare. In an inflation targeting regime there can be a significant improvement in terms of the CV of deterministic consumption. We make three exercises 'E1-E3'. E1 assumes that coefficient k S has only the pro-cyclicality constraint k S ≥ 0 which appears to be binding. Internal optima for the coefficients are marked in bold in all tables. In E1-E3 we found internal optima for the Taylor rule coefficients k π and k Y . The problem of solution E1 is large exchange rate volatility which is a result of the close to random walk dynamics of S t . To eliminate this we can set the coefficient in the Taylor rule to k S > 0 and to repeat the maximization. Columns E2 and E3 in Table A5 demonstrate optimization result for k S = 0.02 and k S = 0.05 respectively. In the column E3, we see appropriate exchange rate volatility and significant improvement of the main criterion. The results of welfare optimization favor of a floating exchange rate regime (k IR → ∞) and no CROR (θ B = 0). These results are broadly in line with the empirical and theoretical literature on inflation targeting.
Optimal CROR
The second optimization exercise is devoted to the optimization over the probability of CROR θ B for the Baseline model with historical (estimated) coefficients in two monetary policy rules:
The results are presented in Table A6 . The most interesting result presented in Table A6 is the existence of an internal optimum for the probability of CROR θ B = 0.151. To analyze this result we added in the last column of Table A6 the criteria for the model with historical (estimated) coefficients in two rules and no CROR θ B = 0. We can see that the model with optimal θ B leads to a small improvement compared to M1 in terms of the main criterion and that improvement almost disappears if we compare it to θ B = 0. As we assumed before possible advantages of CROR are related with peculiar monetary policy regime the BoR used during the GFC and disappear when we analyze optimal inflation targeting framework. We also should note that CB has no full control over CR process in a period of financial crises. Many financial organizations are in trouble during the financial crises, for instance, they may have asymmetric information problem, collateral constraints problem, financial market fragmentation problem. In such a situation they cannot get financing neither from other financial market participants nor from CB, because they cannot meet the requirements for getting financing by conventional monetary tools. Financial market frictions make a significant contribution to CROR during financial crises and the main task of the CB is to mitigate such problem by different unconventional monetary policy tools.
Different Monetary Regimes: Simulation on Russian Data
To comprehend the results of the two maximization exercises above, we simulate the model for different monetary regimes: Classic Taylor rule (CTR), Fixed exchange rate (FER), Fixed official rate (FOR), and Optimal Taylor rule (OTR). The results are presented in Table A7 .
We have included in Table A7 only regimes with appropriate exchange rate volatility. 10 The best value for the main criterion among the different regimes (+2.39%) is achieved in OTR, where the official rate reacts only to the output gap and does not react to inflation. Additional criteria for OTR are quite poor: much higher inflation and exchange rate volatility. FOR is a more balanced regime. It has a good improvement in terms of the main criterion (+1.82%) and low exchange rate volatility. Optimal inflation targeting (OIT) has a moderate improvement in terms of the main criterion (+1.22%) but lower inflation in comparison with OTR and FOR.
CTR demonstrates surprisingly poor performance. CTR gives higher volatilities of consumption, working hours, inflation and exchange rate in comparison with OIT and FOR. The main explanation is that the stabilizing effect of the official rate on inflation in the model starts with k π > 1.1. So Taylor rule-based models with moderate coefficients have worse performance than FOR. The stabilizing effect on inflation enough to improve on FOR in terms of Eπ 2 t corresponds to k π > 3.2. FER has moderate inflation and a zero exchange rate volatility but a poor value for the main criterion (-0.27%). M1 outperforms FER in both welfare and inflation stability. Both M1 and FER have significant drawbacks in comparison with the other regimes: they are prone to exchange rate crises. In making all welfare calculations we did not take that into account.
To make an additional check for the optimal probability of the CROR inference we performed optimization exercises for all the referenced regimes. The main finding is that artificial introduction of financial frictions may give very small improvement (+0.01% in terms of the main criterion) of monetary policy performance only in two regimes with poor performance: historical regime with limited exchange rate adjustment and Classical Taylor rule (see Tables A6 and A7 ). We have found several Pareto-efficient monetary policy regimes: optimal inflation targeting, optimal Taylor rule, fixed official rate and all of them should not include CROR.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether CROR performed by a CB may soften the open economy trilemma constraint and improve results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. It also contributes to the optimal monetary regime choice for Russia.
To answer the questions raised we elaborated a DSGE model analyzed the forwardlooking behavior of households facing a non-zero probability of CROR. Introducing liquidity constraints into the model allows customizing the model to give a high correlation between consumption and current income. Introducing CROR into the model provides a reasonable restriction on the independence of the two monetary instruments and helps explain the pro-cyclical behavior of risk premium, interest rates and consumption.
The Bayesian estimation of the model on Russian quarterly data from 2001:Q1 -2014:Q2 empirically confirms the idea of including liquidity constraint and CROR blocks in the model. To demonstrate this we estimated four alternative models and, assuming that the data are described by the one of four models, we found that the posterior probability of the hypothesis 'the baseline model is true' is 89.2%. Posterior modes for the share of temporarily liquidity constrained households and the probability of CROR were estimated at 22% and 66% respectively.
We made two types of exercises devoted to optimal monetary policy regime choice. First, we simulated the model for identifying the CROR contribution to Russian macroeconomic dynamics on the base of historical shocks revealed in a process of Baseline model estimation. Analysis of such contribution during the global financial crisis clarifies the channel through which the CROR influenced economy. The underlying mechanism is related with forward-looking behavior of agents understanding non-zero probability of losing access to financing at the official rate in the future. It amplifies the automatic stabilizer effect of exchange rate fluctuation and creates countercyclical dynamics in GDP and consumption. At the same time, the resulting effect of the CROR on welfare is small and ambiguous.
Second, we simulated a DSGE model with different values for the coefficients in the Taylor rule, the exchange rate adjustment rule and the probability of CROR. To make welfare maximization exercises we decompose the unconditional expectation of utility for the level effect and stabilization (variance) effect. The results of the welfare optimization exercises and the calculations for different monetary regimes made on the basis of the estimated DSGE model demonstrate the tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare regimes. We found the local optimum with relatively high Taylor rule coefficients and relatively low-inflation volatility (optimal inflation targeting regime). The other local optimum for optimal Taylor rule regime has better welfare criterion but much higher inflation and exchange rate volatilities. Between the two local optima, we found an intermediate solution in terms of welfare and inflation with no reaction of the official rate to inflation and output gap (fixed official rate regime). Regime with classical Taylor rule demonstrates a surprisingly poor performance.
We found that a floating regime appears to be the best exchange rate regime for Russia in all optimization exercises. This is in contrast with the results of Shulgin (2015) which, on the basis of a similar DSGE model without financial imperfections, demonstrated the need for exchange rate smoothing for better monetary policy performance.
Welfare optimization over the CR parameter gives a mixed result. We found the optimal value for the probability of CROR for the model with a historical (estimated) coefficient as 15%. The same exercise for the model with the Classic Taylor rule gives the optimal value as 20%. However, the resulting improvement in welfare was very small and we also did not find an internal optimum for that parameter for other regimes. We, therefore, infer that the optimal monetary regime should not include CROR. Abandoning that controversial element from Russian monetary policy practice could bring Russia welfare a gain of 0.15% in terms of deterministic consumption. Optimal inflation targeting regime adapting will bring much more significant gain of 1.22% in terms of consumption and more stable inflation. n and o denote non-optimizing and optimizing households respectively. Household j will have no ability to smooth consumption during the period t+1 with probability θ A and has to consume only additional interest payments on marginal savings dC n t+1 (j) = −(P t /P t+1 )i t dC t (j). The same logics may be apply to the period t+2: with probability θ A (1 − θ A ) it will consume dC o t+2 (j) = −(P t /P t+2 )(1 + i t+1 )dC t (j). With probability θ A 2 it will consume interest payments dC n t+2 (j) = −(P t /P t+2 )i t+1 dC t (j) . Recurring in this way we may find the expected utility of marginal consumption which should optimally be zero:
Rearranging (A1) gives Equation (6):
Credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) We assume that every period with probability 1 − θ B household j may have the ability to adjust its domestic assets volume to optimal level B t = B o t . With probability θ B the household leaves it unchanged B t = B t−1 .
Foreign and domestic assets are substitutes for achieving the optimal level of financing Fin t which household j demands in period t. Changes in financing depend on the difference between current consumption and current income. For the households which received the signal to adjust their financing level (with probability 1 − θ A ) such difference is
We use superscript o to refer the optimal levels of variables for households which have the ability to adjust both B t and B * t in period t. For households not having the ability to smooth their consumption path in period t (with probability θ A ) Fin n t = 0. We use superscript opt to refer the levels of foreign and domestic assets for the case when a household may adjust its level of B t in every period. In that case, marginal financing costs equal the official rate i ref ,t and the levels of foreign and domestic assets satisfy:
where i t (j) is expressed in terms of the domestic currency interest rate of foreign financing:
To calculate the loss function we find the Taylor series expansion of (A6) around B * opt t
Then the loss function is
If the level of domestic and foreign assets in period t+k is still to be set in period t we have
The first-order condition for (A10) gives:
Appendix B. Estimation
Calibrated values
The ratios G , EX and MN are calculated on the basis of Rosstat statistics of Russian GDP and value added by different sectors at constant 2008 prices. The ratios XEX , i * /EX are calculated on the basis of Russian balance of payments. The ratios IR * /EX and B * /EX are calculated on the basis of the Russian international investments position. To calculate the ratio NT we total error and omission items, private and government transfers, wage transfers, government debt operations and suspicious capital transactions in the balance of payments.
To find the steady-state values of the risk premium rp, domestic and foreign interest ratesī and i * and to calculate intertemporal discount factor β we resolve next system:
where the sensitivity of the risk premium to the indebtedness level τ is estimated. We normalize the following steady-state values for the real and nominal parts of domestic and foreign economies:Ā = 1,Ȳ * = 1,P = 1,P * = 1,P * X = 1. (A13) Parameters w ex , γ M and γ N are not supplied exogenously but calculated together with the steadystate values of all endogenous variables. Prior probability that the model Mj is true 25% 25% 25% 25%
Posterior probability that the model Mj is true 89.2% 0.1% 10.5% 0.2% Figure A1 . Impulse-response function on 1 std. dev. oil price shock η PX,t . Figure A2 . Impulse-response function on the 1 std. dev. total factor productivity shock η A,t . Figure A3 . Impulse-response function on the 1 std. dev. official rate shock η PR,t . Figure A4 . Impulse-response function on the 1 std. dev. exchange rate policy shock η S,t .
Appendix C. Results of the model simulation assuming no CROR Figure A5 . Contribution of CROR to the dynamics of consumption C t and output Y t compared with observable deviations of these variables from their trends. Figure A6 . Contribution of CROR to the dynamics of worked hours H t and utility t compared with simulated deviations of these variables from their steady-state values in the baseline model. Figure A7 . Contribution of CROR to the dynamics of exchange rate S t and international reserves IR t compared with observable deviations of these variables from their trends. Figure A8 . Contribution of CROR to the dynamics of net foreign assets B * t and home assets B t compared with simulated deviations of these variables from their steady-state values in the baseline model. 3.35·10 −2 3.54·10 −2 3.56·10 −2 4.20·10 −2 3.22·10 −2 3.17·10 −2 Eπ 2 t 5.93·10 −5 6.13·10 −5 6.95·10 −5 6.97·10 −5 6.00·10 −5 6.36·10 −5 9.24·10 −5 ES 2 t 0.0035 0.0321 0.0315 0.0313 0 0.0151 0.1139
Appendix D. Results of welfare optimization
Appendix E. Sensitivity of the main results to non-tradable sector share.
For clarifying the role of non-tradable sector in the model and for checking main results robustness I repeat main steps of the research assuming different shares of non-tradable sectors in home-produced goods. 
